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ARGUMENT
1.

Standard of Review.
Appellees allege that the determination of whether or not to award attorney fees

under the inherent power is a discretionary decision of the trial court that is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Appellees' Brief at 1. This may be correct for the
Third Federal Circuit, as noted mDardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125 (3d. Cir. 1999).
But in Utah, the Court reviews an award of fees pursuant to statute or contract under the
correction of error standard. Valance v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998).
There would appear to be no policy reason while an award pursuant to the court's
"inherent power" should be reviewed differently. Stewart v. Publ Serv. Comm., 885 P.2d
759, 782-84 (Utah 1994) illustrates that attorney fees awarded under the "inherent power"
are reviewed for correctness. However, the standard of review does not matter in this
case, in as much as an award of attorney fees to Linnea was an abuse of discretion in any
event. See Appellants' Brief at 24-41.
2.

Rikki and Joe Have Properly Sought Certiorari and Have Properly Cited the
Relevant Facts and Legal Theories in Support of their Petition.
The Appellees have misinterpreted Butterfield v. Okubo and its progeny. 831 P.2d

97, 101 n.2 (Utah 1992). The point of these cases is that, on a petition for certiorari, the
Supreme Court reviews the challenged part of the Court of Appeals' decision and the trial
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law related thereto. What the Court does not
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do is conduct a plenary, de novo review of the trial court's decision as if it were the Court
of Appeals. Thus, in State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1995), this Court stated:
We first clarify our standard of review. On certiorari, we review the
decision of the court of appeals, not the decision of the trial court. . . . In
doing so, this court adopts the same standard of review used by the court of
appeals: questions of law are reviewed for correctness, and the trial court's
factual findings are reversed only if clearly erroneous. . . . The issues
presented in this case—whether Harmon's arrest was constitutional and
whether her consent to search was voluntary-are questions of law that we
review for correctness.... The trial court's underlying factual findings will
not be set aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.
(Citations omitted). The Court states the standard for reviewing the factual findings of
the trial court because those findings are reviewed to the extent the issue on appeal
requires that review.
The Court of Appeals erred in applying the Supreme Court's dicta in Stewart v.
Publ Serv. Cornm., 885 P.2d 759, 782-84 (Utah 1994). If the Supreme Court agrees, then
it can, if it chooses, establish the correct statement of the rule and remand the case to the
Court of Appeals for a reconsideration of its ruling. In essence, the Appellees claim that
the Supreme Court must remand all cases. Appellees' Brief at 18-21. That claim is
erroneous. The Supreme Court has recognized on multiple occasions that it can and
should rule on an issue as a matter of judicial economy. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 908
P.2d 856 (Utah,1995). In Brooks, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted prior court
decisions and held that it did not need to consider the defendant's argument for reversal
of his conviction on the basis of "plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel."
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Rather than remanding to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled on the matter at
issue. It held: "[Considerations of judicial economy suggest that we dispose of these
issues ourselves. We therefore turn to the merits of Brooksf claims of plain error and
ineffective assistance of counsel." Id. at 860.
Similarly, in this case, the Court of Appeals held that the only relevant finding was
whether a recovery had been made for the benefit of the beneficiaries of the trust.
Hughes v. Cafferty, 46 P.3d at f25. Thus, the Court of Appeals here, as in Brooks,
ignored the other factual issues that it should have considered. Accordingly, Rikki and
Joe properly asked the Court to set the appropriate rule and to rule on their appeal without
remand based on the findings of the trial court and other undisputed evidence.
Appellants' Brief at 41-42.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, on a certiorari review, it can affirm the
Court of Appeals' decision "on any legal ground or theory supported by the record."
State v. Weeks, 2002 WL 31246086 (Utah 2002), ^ 10. It is not enough for Rikki and Joe
to show that the Court of Appeals erred; they must also establish that correcting the error
makes a difference in the outcome. They must analyze the rule as adopted by the Court of
Appeals, the correct statement of the rule, and the application of the facts to the correctly
stated rule. Only then can the Supreme Court review the issue upon which it granted
certiorari.
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Where the Supreme Court must consider the factual context, the findings of the
trial court, and other undisputed facts, the Supreme Court is certainly in a position not
only to establish the correct rule, but also to apply the rule to the undisputed facts of the
case. Since this litigation began in May 1996, Rikki and Joe have asked the Supreme
Court to do this in the interest of judicial economy.
Likewise, the Appellees incorrectly claim that Rikki and Joe are raising issues for
the first time in their Appellants' Brief. Appellees' Brief at 21. Rikki and Joe made these
points at both the trial court level, R. at 1934 et seq., and with the Court of Appeals,
Appellants' Brief to the Court of Appeals at 20-40. Moreover, having stated that these
factual issues are irrelevant, the Appellees then state "the court of appeals correctly stated
the rule . . . and then correctly applied that rule to the facts of this case ...." Appellees'
Brief at 26. Clearly, the Appellees cannot argue that the facts were correctly applied
without considering what those facts are. Rikki and Joe would suggest that Appellees
would like the Court to ignore pages 24-41 of their Appellants' Brief because that
analysis effectively shows that it is inequitable and unjust to award attorney fees to
Linnea based on the undisputed facts in this case.
Rikki and Joe do not need the Court to reverse any other portions of the appellate
court's decision; however, this Court has authority to overrule clearly erroneous rulings of
the trial court that bear on the issue at hand: Should Linnea Bennett be awarded attorney
fees in this matter? See Appellants' Brief at 24-41. Even if the Court does not overturn a
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finding, in order to determine whether or not it is equitable and just to award Linnea
attorney fees directly from Rikki and Joe, the Court needs to consider the gravity of
Rikki's and Joe's misconduct. For example, it is relevant to note that the trial court's
finding that the five children were the proper trustees of the Family Trust from 1979
forward (R. 1950-48) violates the express provisions of UCA Section 75-7-405.l
Appellants' Brief at 28-29. It is not necessary for the Court to reverse the trial court's
finding that all five children were the Trustees of Family Trust from 1979 onward. Rikki
and Joe simply ask the Court to consider this point in weighing the gravity of their
misconduct in not recognizing this "fact." Without reversing the trial court's finding, the
Supreme Court can still rule that Rikki's and Joe's failure to recognize this "fact" was not
egregious or bad faith misconduct (or misconduct at all). Moreover, as noted by State v.
Harmon, supra, the Supreme Court can overrule that clearly erroneous finding of fact for
the limited purpose of weighing Rikki's and Joe's conduct as Trustees.
The nature of the misconduct is clearly affected by the underlying facts. The trial
court's holding that the trustees repay the attorney fee paid to Mr. Middaugh to open the
California conservatorship would have an entirely different tenor if the amount paid had
been $500,000 rather than $5,000, or if the purpose in hiring the attorney had been to hide
trust assets for the benefit of Rikki and Joe instead of to recover $100,000 of marital trust

1

That section of the Utah Code provides that on the inability of one co-trustee to
serve, the other co-trustee(s) continue to serve.
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assets. Appellants' Brief at 34-36. Likewise, the holding that Rikki and Joe repay
$55,000 in trustee fees would have a different tenor if their hourly rate had been $2,000
per hour prior to reduction, as opposed to $8.30 per hour. Appellants' Brief at 41. These
facts are important to any reasoned analysis of the equity and justice of awarding attorney
fees to Linnea against Rikki and Joe.
Finally, Appellees claim that Rikki and Joe have raised issues that were not
addressed in their Petition for Certiorari. Appellees' Brief at 20. This is incorrect. As
this Court held in DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), "In granting a petition for
certiorari, we review f,[o]nly the questions set forth in the petition or fairly included
therein." Id. at 443. Where the issue is whether it is equitable and just to award attorney
fees against a trustee in favor of a beneficiary, the Court must examine the conduct of the
trustee and the beneficiary. While Rikki and Joe believe that the factual issues addressed
by Rikki and Joe must be reviewed to apply the rule, those factual issues at a minimum
are "fairly included [ in Rikki's and Joe's Petition for Certiorari]."
3.

Rikki and Joe Have Used the Facts to Support Their Argument; the Appellees
Use Unsupported Facts and Characterizations.
In their Appellants' Brief, Rikki and Joe have carefully identified the factual

findings of the trial court and the undisputed facts, providing citations to the record for all
of these points. In comparison, the Appellees often make outrageous and false
characterizations without any citation to the record (because there is no record support).
Consider their conclusion: "[T]he wrongful conduct of Rikki and Joe . .. constituted
Page 6

oppressive, malicious, and badfaith conduct...." Appellees' Brief at 45. Neither the
trial court nor the Court of Appeals made any such statement. As carefully explained in
the Appellants' Brief at 24 through 41, the facts of the case simply do not support any
such allegation. While many of the misstatements have been identified in this brief, there
are some that are not. Rikki and Joe simply ask the Court to note when facts and
characterizations are alleged without citations to the record. The reason for these
"lapses" {see URAP Rule 24(a)(7) and (e)) is that the record simply does not support the
factual allegation or characterization.
4.

The Appellees' Hypocritical Reliance on the March 1993 Documents and
Criticism of the Recovery of $100,000 for the Marital Trust.
The Appellees criticize Rikki and Joe for refusing to accept the 1993 amendments

to the Marital and Family Trust. Appellees' Brief at 12-13. This is rank hypocrisy. Not
one of the affidavits the Contestants executed claimed the right to act as Trustee based on
the 1993 Trust Amendment. See Exhibits 13, 17, and 18. More importantly, when the
Contestants sought a declaratory judgment in November 1997 declaring the trustees of the
trusts, they did not even advise the Court of the 1993 Amendment, much less seek to have
its terms enforced. R. 1244-48 (Linnea's Motion and Memorandum), R. 1249-53
(Dwight's), 1254-58 (John's). The reason for this is that they knew their father was
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incompetent to sign the amendments. T.2912 (Linnea's testimony Mac would sign
anything put in front of him).
The Appellees further state, without citation to the record, that "it is unrebutted
that both Joe and Rikki were aware of Mac's intention to keep the money he and Leora
had taken from Marital Trust and maintain i t . . . separate from the trusts and the
beneficiaries." Appellees'Brief at 13. This is absolutely false. Leora took the money.
T.988, 1003-04. Indeed, Mac signed Exhibit 212, the first contract where Leora agreed to
return the money to the trust. And only Leora signed the second contract, Exhibit 49, and
it provided that Leora was to return the money. Exhibit 49. Finally, they claim that "the
Utah [conservatorship] proceeding reversed the efforts of Joe and Rikki [in the California
proceedings] and rendered the entire California proceeding a waste of time and trust
assets." Appellees' Brief at 14. This is true only if you consider the recovery of
$100,000 in trust assets to be "a waste of time and trust assets." R.1943 (Trial Court's
finding that Rikki and Joe recovered $100,000 for the Marital Trust). If the Appellees are
so sure this was a waste of time and money, Rikki and Joe stand ready and willing to
accept $20,000 from each of them (representing their share of the $100,000 Rikki and Joe
recovered).

2

"T." stands for transcript. It can be found at R.2473 and 2474.
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5.

The Supreme Court Should State a Rule of Law that Makes Sense for Utah.
Rikki and Joe believe that the authorities cited on pages 22 through 26 and 28-32

of the Appellees' Brief, properly analyzed {compare Appellants' Brief at 17-22), support
their contention as to the nature of the rule that should be adopted by Utah. While the
Appellees are technically correct that no jurisdiction has adopted the Rule as proposed by
Rikki and Joe, Appellees' Brief at 27, certainly the Washington Supreme Court has
adopted a rule that is similar in intent. In Allard v. Pacific National Bank, 663 P.2d 104
(Wash. 1983), the Washington Supreme Court held: "Ordinarily, the trust estate must
bear the general costs of administration of the trust, including the expenses of necessary
litigation. . . . Where litigation is necessitated by the inexcusable conduct3 of the trustee,
however, the trustee individually must pay those expenses." Id. at 112. But, in the final
analysis, regardless of what other jurisdictions have done (or have not done), the critical
question for the Court is what makes sense for Utah?
What the Appellees seem to forget is that the starting point for an analysis of when
a beneficiary should be awarded attorney fees is the "American Rule." Stewart, 885 P.2d
at 782. Under the American Rule, absent a statute or contract, no matter the fault of the
parties, each pays its own fees. Thus, absent an exception, the beneficiary's attorney fees
would be paid by the beneficiary. The purpose of the "inherent power" exception is to
insure that justice and equity prevail. Under the Court of Appeals' analysis, the American

3

And the Court described that breach as "egregious." Id. at 111.
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Rule is simply discarded when there is a recovery from a trustee. As a matter of public
policy, that makes no sense. If a recovery is all that is necessary for an award of attorney
fees against a trustee, why should it not also apply against any other losing litigant? A car
driver can be far more negligent and careless, and cause far more damage, than a trustee,
where both cause losses to others. To award attorney fees to the beneficiary as a matter
of course without regard to both the conduct of the trustee and the beneficiary means that
the American Rule is not" the general rule in Utah" in trust litigation between a trustee
and a beneficiary. Stewart, 885 P.2d at 782.
The Appellees criticize Rikki and Joe for changing their proposed rule between the
Petition for Certiorari and their Appellants' Brief. Appellees' Brief at 28-32. There is no
basis for this criticism. The Supreme Court's statements in Stewart were dicta. The
Supreme Court did not have to make any analysis of the application of those statements
since that was not the basis for the Court's decision in Stewart. This case offers the Court
the opportunity to establish the rule that Utah courts will follow in cases like this in the
future. Rikki and Joe have modified the proposed rule in their Appellants' Brief only to
reflect their additional thinking on the point. The proposed rule is only that. The Court is
free to shape its own rule. Interestingly, the Appellees have offered the Court no
guidance.
The Appellees' criticism that Rikki's and Joe's statement of the rule has removed
any discretion is unwarranted. Appellees' Brief at 28-30. Rikki and Joe believe the
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statement of the rule indicates that the trial court has discretion within the guidelines
provided. It expressly reaffirms the "inherent power to award attorney fees to a
beneficiary who obtains a recovery for the benefit of a fiduciary estate." It contemplates
that the trial court may or may not determine it is just and equitable to award fees. If the
trial court awards fees, the rule provides guidelines for determining when the award
should be charged to the estate and when it should be charged to the fiduciary.
Appellants' Brief at 23. However, if this needs clarification, the Supreme Court can
certainly state that the "inherent power" is to be exercised "in the discretion of the trial
court." Similarly, the criticism that the proposed rule requires the trial court to weigh
irrelevant facts and circumstances, Appellees' Brief at 29-30, can be cured by adding the
word "relevant" before "facts and circumstances."
The Appellees' criticism would have been better directed towards the Court of
Appeals' decision. It is the Court of Appeals' application of Stewart that is rigid and
unbending. There is no effort to analyze the relevant facts and circumstances of the case
to determine if an award is equitable and just. The "only relevant fact" is whether there is
a recovery. Hughes v. Cafferty, 46 P.3d at ^[25; see also Id. at ^25, n.2. Thus, the
Appellees' argument concerning Rikki's and Joe's statement of the proposed rule shows
how improper the Court of Appeals' decision is.

Page 11

6.

There was No "Considered Opinion" of the Trial Court or the Court of
Appeals Regarding Linnea's Conduct as a Trustee.
The Appellees argue that "[i]n the considered of [sic] opinion of both courts, there

was no wrongful conduct by Linnea

" Appellees' Brief at 31. Further, Appellees

allege: "The record shows that both courts addressed Linnea's conduct and found that it
was proper. Hughes at Tfll; (R. 1959,1937-36)."4 Appellees'Brief at 33. RikkiandJoe
believe that a "considered" opinion would be one that addresses the issue and then
resolves it. Neither court ever discussed Linnea's behavior as a trustee. Paragraph 11 of
the Court of Appeals' decision, the trial court's discussion at R. 1959, and the trial court's
discussion at R. 1937-36 contain no findings regarding Linnea's conduct as a trustee.
Indeed, there could be no discussion of her conduct as a trustee, followed by any reasoned
explanation of why, notwithstanding that misconduct, Linnea still should be awarded
attorney fees. The purpose of the trial was to consider Rikki's and Joe's objections to the
Final Ballot she approved as trustee (R.1427), and none of the actions Linnea took as a
trustee in the Final Settlement Ballot formed the basis of the trial court's ultimate
decision. Compare Exhibit 20 with the trial court's Memorandum Decision, R.1960 et

4

The Appellees even cite footnote two of the opinion. Appellees' Brief at 36-37.
After stating that the "only relevant fact" was whether there was a recovery, in footnote
two, the Court of Appeals stated: "Accordingly, we need not reach Rikki and Joe's
challenges to other findings of fact." That hardly supports the Appellees' claim.
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seq. In terms of an award of fees, Linnea5 s misconduct equaled or exceeded that of Rikki
and Joe. See generally Appellants' Brief at 24-26.
7,

Rikki and Joe Did Not Receive Any Benefit from the Recovered Monies in
Their Role as Beneficiaries.
Contrary to the Appellees' claims,5 Appellees' Brief at 38, the trial court required

Rikki and Joe to be charged for the excess fees and the Middaugh payment. It is not what
the trial court said, it is what it did, that matters. The amounts they were charged were
taken from Rikki's and Joe's distributive share and then paid directly to three of the five
beneficiaries. R. 1939-38. That means that the Trust was not benefitted.6 Rikki and Joe
as beneficiaries were harmed by the Trustees' misconduct just as any other beneficiary.
Linnea has acted in the interest of only three of the five beneficiaries, and at her request,
Rikki and Joe, in their capacities as beneficiaries, were not allowed to participate in the
recovery. Whatever Rikki's and Joe's faults as Trustee, no one found them guilty of
misconduct as a beneficiary. Thus, Linnea has not provided a benefit to the Trust, but
only to three of the five trust beneficiaries.

5

And contrary to the Appellees' own statement earlier in their brief that: "The
trial court required Rikki and Joe to pay from their distributive share the $5,230 of trust
funds they had spent on attorney fees ...." Appellees' Brief at 14-15.
6

Thus, the "common theory" underlying the Stewart decision would not apply. Stewart,
885 P.2d at 782-84.
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8.

Rikki and Joe Properly Appealed the March 1998 Declaratory Judgment.
Appellees claim that Rikki and Joe could not appeal the trial court's March 1998

Declaratory Judgment because they failed to do so within thirty days following the entry
of the judgment. Appellees' Brief at 42-44. The cases cited for this proposition all
involve situations were an appeal was taken before an estate was closed, and the appellate
court, taking a "pragmatic view", held that the appeal was timely because the order
appealed was final for appeal purposes. In re Morrison, 933 P.2d 1015, 1016 (Utah App.
1997). That does not, however, mean that an appeal that is taken when the order truly
becomes final after the estate administration is concluded is untimely. Rikki and Joe ask
the Court to note this point in its opinion in any event. Otherwise, probate litigators will
appeal every intermediate order because an appellate court may later deem the order final
as to some important issue in the litigation. The "pragmatic rule" should be applied in a
pragmatic manner. Id. The March 1998 Declaratory Judgment was timely appealed. See
Notice of Appeal, R.2278.
CONCLUSION
In establishing a rule that gives Utah courts guidance in exercising their "inherent
power" to award attorney fees to beneficiaries and against the trust estate or the trust,
Rikki and Joe ask the Court to consider the following factors:
a.

The administration of trusts is becoming more and more complex. A trustee
may need to deal with income tax issues (IRC §641 et seq.), environmental
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waste issues (UCA §75-1-109), creditor claims (UCA §75-7-308 etseq.\
and a host of other problems that either did not exist for most of the
twentieth century or existed in a far less complex environment.
b.

Trusts are commonly administered by non-professional family members
who must depend on the advice of professionals.7

c.

While trustees should be held to a high standard of conduct, they should not
be penalized by an award of attorney fees to the beneficiaries absent a
showing of egregious or bad faith misconduct. Otherwise, the rule
undermines the flexibility and usefulness of trusts in family settings.

Thus, Rikki and Joe believe that they have suggested a reasonable rule that
balances the interests of beneficiaries, trustees, and the public policy concerns of this
state. Rikki and Joe ask the Court to adopt the rule in substantially the form they have
proposed, to apply that rule to the undisputed facts of this case, to reverse the decisions of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court, and to order the trial court to enter judgment
without an award of attorney fees to Linnea Bennett.

7

The Court should note that Rikki and Joe were told by attorney Michael Loveridge that
the 1974 Trust did not appoint thefivechildren beneficiaries of the children's trust (T.814) and,
indeed, he drafted the Bennett resignation, delegation, and appointment documents (Exhibits 23
and 25; notary signature); they were told by attorney Doug Morrison that the 1974 Family Trust
could be restated as part of the 1987 Trust (see Exhibit 2 at 1); they were told by attorney Doug
Morrison and their father that they would serve as trustees until they were "unable or unwilling to
serve for any reason" (Exhibit 47); they hired the accountant that Mac had used to do his
accounting work to prepare the accounting (T.347,892) that the trial court found to be "less than
useful." R. 1937-36; and theyfiledthe California conservatorship on the advice of counsel
(T.823-829; see also T.735-737, T.1203)
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